During the first half of the 20th century anthropology was characterized by a “programmatic avoidance of theoretical synthesis” (250) and attempted to rid itself of armchair scholars. This movement was led by Franz Boas and his approach has now come to be known as historical particularism. This strategy required an “almost total suspension of the normal dialectic between fact and theory” (251), and further, had limited success. Boas is seen as the guru of anthropology, and though his contributions shouldn’t be discredited, homáge should be paid via objectivie criticism. His students deny that he is at the center of any school of thought, while simultaneously appaluding him for elevating anthropology to a science. There is some truth to this praise even though his cautious approach to making generalizations appears over-done and self-defeating in retrospect (253). Compared to his contemporaries, Boas shines while his peers’ ideas come off as “hayseeds and bumpkins” (257). A pressing matter was that too much romantic, armchair scholarship had permeated, thus, Boas placed emphasis on actual fieldwork and time with the primitives. When he attacked the comparative method, it was Daniel G. Brinton whom he had in mind (Brinton accused Tylor and Morgan of over-diffusionism! – 256). However, Boas did not deny that there were universal similarities, just that they had been grossly overestimated. He felt there was a need for both approaches, but felt the particularist approach was apt for the time (259). Essentially, he made the argument that different paths lead to the [same] phenomena ≈ parallel evolution.
According to Boas, parallel evolution rested on the assumption that there was a “master plan” and that variations were mere minor details in this grand scheme (258). A particularist approach was needed to demonstrate the more general approach of parallel evolution so that conclusions could be drawn. Thus, he was concerned with disproving evolution, but instead, trying to improve the science of culture. Boas did argue that diffusion was more common than independent invention, but warned diffusionist not to make premature conclusions.
Physicalist v. Hisotrical Approach
While he and his students collected tons of first-hand data, few conclusions were made to avoid premature conclusions – one of the fundamental errors in the approach, but contrary to some arguments, he did not retard anthropology’s development. Boas rejected what can be termed as physicalism: researching trying to find the existence and guidance of universal laws. His response: to consider the subject over the laws so as not to deny the importance of individual occurences (262). This response operated contrary to his background in physics; his opposition often emphasize this as his strong point. In the German school of Weltanschaung, a neo-Kantian movement took place that steered him away fromt the materialist approach in physics, to geography, and then to ethnography. He took it as his life-task to investigate this shift: How far may we consider the phenomena of organic life, and especially thos of the psychic life, from a mechanic point of view and what conclusions can be drawn from such considerations? (263-4)
The neo-Kantian movement was a rejection of Hegel’s ideas. Kant argued that knowledge is based on the percepction of the senses, the essence of external things was neithe rmind nor matter, but simply unknowable. This formula can be synthesized in 2 ways:
- As a justification for a strong empirical approach through sensory data.
- The justification for emphasizing the contribution that the observing mind makes to the perception of the data.
Boas had studied Kant and worked under professor heavily involved in the neo-Kantian movement. Boas was also profoundly interested in the neo-Kantian psychologist Wilhelm Windelband and Aeinrich Rickert who developed the dichotomy of idiographic-nomothetic (270). They made a distinction between human and natural sciences respectively and stressed the former though eventually abandoning this position. Dilthey, on the other hand, argued both were relevant to human studies and should have 3 objectives:
- Description of historical facts.
- Discover of laws and regularities.
- The formulation of standards of value.
The neo-Kantian rejection of scientism much mirrored the theological attacks on reason during the Enlightenment and an urge was made to return life to its “mystery” and wrest if from scientific models. According to them, ideograph provided better understanding of things because it was based on actual happenings; as opposed to science that deduced abstract laws and tried to fit reality into them (273). Boas’ positions were moderate in comparison – while stressing the idiographic, he eventually did argue that the most important am of ethnography was discovery of scientific laws (274). Kroeber, one of Boas’ students, was critical of his professor for not being particularist enough (making Kroeber an idiographic extremist). Its been argued that Boas maintained the same position throughout his life, but under examination, his intellectual development can be placed into 3 phases (277-82):
- Rejection of unilinear, universl sequences but not rejection of more limited parallel sequences. A search for laws as an important aim.
- The human mind tends to reach the same results under varying conditions (not similar ones). Cultural life is economically conditioned and economics are culturally conditioned (279-80).
- Boas abandoned any nomothetic attempts in favor of idiographic aims and ends up arguing that historical laws would remain undiscoverable.
While the laws of sciene developed, but the Boasians continued to precieve them as rigid and stagnant. They denied nomotheticism, were cautious of generalities, and tried to refute every form of determinism. As a result, the Boas approach was incredibly ecclectic (284):
- Induction – inference of a generalized conclusion from particular instances.
- Deduction – deriving a conclusion by reason, specifically inference in which the conclusion about particular follows necessarily from general or univeral premises.
Ecclecticism is the “path of least resistance” (284) and one Boas was insistent upon despite its hidden dangers:
- Its often little more than euphemism for confusion, muddled acceptance of contradictory theories, the bankruptcy of creative thought, and the cloak of mediocrity.
- Provides a false sense of security and unearned reputation for scientific acumen.
- Science is not just responsibility to data, but data must be responsible to theory. “Neither one suffices without the other. It is impossible to be faithful to the facts and at the same time indifferent to theory” (ibid).
Even if we accept ecclecticism, Boas “never approached a problem by giving full consideration to the entire range of … factors” (285-6). The embarrasing element of Boasian program is that its “inductive to the point of self-destruction” (286). The point was to provide concrete detail in place of speculative deductions; the latter which are the life-blodd of science. The approach wasn’t particularly novel and can be found in the works of Francis Bacon. The collection of facts doesn’t necessarily lead to the discovery of regularities and random samples end up proving that nature is chaotic: complete description of anything is impossible (288). Because of this, theory is needed to structure the data, otherwise, nothing is gained in nomotheticism. The theoretical approach should be deductive, not inductive.
From: Harris, Marvin. 2001 [1968]. The Rise of Anthropological Theory: a history of theories of culture. Updated edition. Lanham: Alta Mira Press.